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Abstract In focusing on characteristics of national cabinets and parliaments, this paper
seeks to understand domestic factors that are conducive to the enforcement of policies
which protect victims of human trafficking in 33 democratic member countries of the
European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD). It argues for the need to consider the role of policymakers when
trying to understand what drives the implementation and enforcement of international
treaties that combat organized crime, such as the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, EspeciallyWomen and Children, in national
policies. In so doing, the paper applies theoretical arguments of comparative politics to
criminology. Multivariate analyses show that the share of female parliamentarians and
the proportion of left wing and social democratic parties in cabinet are significantly and
positively associated with stronger efforts to protect victims of human trafficking. Future
research should expand the insights of this analysis through case studies on parliamentary
behaviour, legislative proposals, and votes related to human trafficking.
Keywords Human trafficking . Victim protection . Compliance . Anti-trafficking
policies . UN anti-trafficking protocol . Political science
Introduction
Human trafficking generates billions in profit at the expense of thousands of victims each
year [1, 2: 75; 3]. This makes understanding the dynamics leading to measures and
policies designed to protect victims of trafficking a critical task. Human trafficking is
defined as “[…] the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
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persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” ([4]: Art. 3(a)). The trade in human
beings affects almost all countries in the world, albeit in a variety of ways [5]. In cases
where victims are trafficked across borders countries can be origin, destination, or a site
of transit for victims of human trafficking. Origin countries are states where victims get
recruited and trafficked away from. Destination countries are states in which the actual
exploitation for labour, involuntary sexual services, and other forms of slavery takes
place. Transit countries are states which are passed through by victims of trafficking
during their transport from origin to destination countries. These categories are not
mutually exclusive, as countries can be origin, destination and sites of transit for human
trafficking simultaneously. Although human trafficking is conventionally conceived as
international crime, domestic trafficking constitutes a significant share of all detected
trafficking cases around the world [6, 7]. In the context of domestic trafficking recruit-
ment of victims, transport, and exploitation takes place within the same country.
Currently, one of the most important global instrument to combat human trafficking
is the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (also known as “UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol” or
“Palermo Protocol”), which was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It
supplements the United Nations Convention Against Transnational and Organized
Crime and divides counter trafficking efforts into three policy dimensions: prevention
of further incidences of trafficking, prosecution of traffickers, and protection of victims.
To date the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol has been ratified by 169 countries,1 but since
it lacks formal enforcement, monitoring, and sanction mechanisms, the levels of
compliance vary considerably between states [8, 9].
This paper aims to examine compliance with articles concerning victim protection of
the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. The paper focuses on the impact of domestic
policymaking, and thus examines the characteristics of national cabinets and parlia-
ments in a sample of 33 democratic member countries of the European Union (EU) or
the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). In so doing
the study applies a political science framework to a problem that has hitherto been
mainly cast in criminological terms. Being created under the auspice of the UN Crime
Commission, the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol was issued under a crime framework,
which has lead to a particular emphasis on prosecution and prevention, while the articles
concerning victim protection measures are formulated with a less binding character
[10]. Victim protection and rehabilitation however are pivotal pillars in the fight against
human trafficking which aims to have long-lasting effects. However, victim protection is
a ‘demanding’ policy dimension to comply with. The UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol
instructs states to grant amnesty to trafficking victims, which often requires changes in a
state’s criminal and immigration laws [4]. Likewise, provision of shelter, legal and
medical assistance as well as authorizing residency permits for trafficking victims are
important pillars for protection and empowerment, but they are also expensive. The
combination of high costs associated with victim protection measures on the one hand
1 See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=
18&lang=en (accessed 7 June 2016).
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and wide discretion conceded to states in regards to compliance with this dimension
owing to the crime framework of the Protocol on the other hand results in high
incentives for states to avoid additional cost and little incentives to comply. This
provides an interesting context in which to study the role of internal characteristics of
states which may be conducive to the enforcement of policies to protect victims of
human trafficking as stipulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol.
Previous research on the adaptation and enforcement of anti-trafficking policies has
predominantly drawn on theories of international relations: states are conceptualized as
unitary, coherent and rational actors whose decisions depend on the structure of the
international system, irrespective of their internal, political composition [9, 11–13].
Hence, counter trafficking efforts are often seen as a product of what happens in the
international system, rather than being brought about by processes within states them-
selves such as advocacy and political representation [14, 15]. An assessment of the role
of characteristics of domestic political factors which are associated with comprehensive
victim protection efforts however is important since eventually it is the responsibility of
the ratifying nation state to implement and enforce the policies proposed in the UN Anti-
Trafficking Protocol. Hence, understanding what drives the enforcement of victim
protection policies warrants a closer examination of domestic legislators, which are
responsible for policymaking. While studies have repeatedly established a positive link
between anti-trafficking efforts and the representation of women in national parliaments
as well as respect for the rights of women in society [8, 9, 12, 14, 16], there are currently
no studies which have analysed characteristics of parliaments and governments beyond
the representation of women in political institutions. Consequently we know little about
how the ideological composition of governments and parliaments shape victim protec-
tion efforts of nation states and whether the positive association between the percentage
of female parliamentarians and compliance with anti-trafficking treaties remains signif-
icant when other government characteristics are controlled for. Anti-trafficking cam-
paigns often work with strongly gendered stereotypes of female victims trafficked by
male perpetrators [17, 18]. The depiction of women as the central group among victims
of human trafficking makes counter- trafficking efforts in general and the protection of
victims in particular a central issue for feminist debate [19: 319; 20]. Hence, female
politicians might take a greater interest in advocating policies to protect and empower
trafficking victims. The debate of human trafficking however goes beyond feminism in
its scope, making it relevant to advocates of human rights, too. Therefore additional
ideological characteristics of national governments should be relevant for compliance
with victim protection as stipulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. Since traffick-
ing victims are among the most deprived population groups, cabinets and parliaments
committed to social justice and the inclusion of underprivilegedminorities might be more
inclined to adopt the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol’s proposal for victim protection.
This article first provides a brief description of the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. A
review of literature establishing characteristics of national governments and parliaments
that might affect a state’s enforcement of victim protection policies follows, from which
four hypotheses about the effects of ideological as well as gender composition of
national cabinets and parliaments on efforts to protect victims of human trafficking
are extracted. These are tested in a sample of 33 democracies between 2000 and 2011
using ordered logit regression. The last section concludes with implications for future
research and political reality.
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The UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol
The fight against human trafficking looks back on 100 years of transnational legal
effort. The 1926 Slavery Convention is the first of many international conventions
against the trade of human beings implemented during the twentieth century. In the
course of increased awareness for transnational crime the OECD and EU member
countries made the eradication of human trafficking a priority issue [21, 22: 101–103].
Simultaneously, Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) campaigned for a global
instrument to facilitate the fight against the trade in human beings [12: 304; 23: 422].
As a result, in 1999 a UN ad-hoc committee supervised by the UN Crime Commission
met to develop the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
and its supplementary protocols. Adopted in 2000, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplementing this
UN Convention has become a legal standard for global efforts to curb human traffick-
ing [23: 422; 24: 82; 22: 104]. In order to comply with the three policy dimensions of
prevention, prosecution, and protection, ratifying states must implement a series of
measures into their domestic policies. Yet, the Protocol imposes no direct sanctions for
non-compliance upon ratifying countries [25: 121].
To prevent trafficking, states need to exchange information and initiate research and
campaigns to raise awareness for the trade in persons. Furthermore, the Protocol requests
the eradication of factors contributing to the vulnerability of populations for trafficking
and exploitation such as poverty, unequal opportunities, and underdevelopment ([4]: Art.
9). The articles concerned with criminalization urge states to establish the trade in human
beings as a criminal offense in their domestic legislation to enable the prosecution of
traffickers and their accomplices ([4]: Art. 5). Protection of victims consists of confi-
dential court proceedings, the provision of legal counselling, housing, medical care, and
compensations, as well as employment opportunities and education ([4]: Art. 6).
Furthermore, Art. 7 suggests the alteration of domestic legal frameworks in order to
provide victims with the opportunity to (temporarily) reside in the country where the
trafficking incident was detected. Article 8 summons the victims’ states of origin to
facilitate their voluntary and safe repatriation by re-issuing lost or stolen passports.
The strategies of protection, prevention and prosecution differ in cost and effort, with
victim protection prescribing some of the most expensive measures to comply with.
Moreover, the three policy dimensions are not equally binding. Since the UN Anti-
Trafficking Protocol was issued by a law-enforcement body – the UN Crime
Commission – it is written with a “crime-fighting frame” [10: 324] which emphasises
punitive above protective measures [26: 67]. Articles concerned with prevention and
prosecution are formulated in imperative, whereas the Protocol’s instructions for victim
protection are attributed with extenuations like “in appropriate cases”, “state parties shall
consider”, or “to the extent possible under domestic law” ([4]: Art. 6–8; [24]: 83). The
discretion conceded to ratifying countries in regards to the protection of trafficking
victims makes compliance with this dimension of the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol a
particularly interesting subject to study, especially with a focus on the role of domestic
politics. Incentives for compliance with victim protection measures as stipulated in the
UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol are little: on the one hand the Protocol’s guidelines in
regards to victim protection are not binding. On the other hand victim protection entails
some of the most costly measures. Assuming that states are rational actors we should
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therefore be able to identify domestic concerns and interests that foster compliance with
guidelines, which are not externally imposed. The analysis of states’ victim protection
efforts in the context of the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol instead of more binding
documents like the 2011 EU Directive on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
and Protecting its Victims or the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings provides a promising approach to identify domestic factors
driving protection efforts. This offers a necessary internal perspective to supplement
existing research on anti-trafficking efforts with its focus on international relations.
Explaining anti-trafficking efforts
Different levels of compliance with the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol have attracted
scholars’ attention [8, 9, 15, 16, 26–30]. This research has identified a set of factors that
drive states’ efforts to prosecute and prevent human trafficking as well as to protect its
victims. Compliance with the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol entails international con-
sequences. On the one hand a country’s procedures against human trafficking might
displace the problem to adjacent states [9, 11: 251]. On the other hand successful
combat of trafficking in destination- and transit states depends on countermeasures in
origin states accountable for most of the former’s trafficking inflow [31: 5]. Therefore,
counter-trafficking efforts are often studied with a theoretical framework based on
international relations.
International relations theory and research perceives states as sovereign, coherent,
and rational entities, which engage with and influence each other in the “international
system” [32, 33]. The international system is characterized by power differentials, as
some states are more influential than others. International relations suggest two main
reasons for states to comply with international treaties lacking formal enforcement and
sanction mechanisms like the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol: they are either coerced
into compliance by other states [32–34], or compliance is a strategic choice of states in
order to raise their reputation and signal credible commitments [35–38].
Coerced compliance may occur because destination countries have an interest in
origin and transit countries tackling the trade in human beings, so that fewer trafficking
flows will affect the receiving states [39]. To this end, powerful destination states can
impose unilateral sanctions on origin countries accountable for most of their trafficking
inflows [40]. Analyses have shown that states which are susceptible to international
pressure due to a poor ranking in the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports issued
by the US Department of State [41] or financial loans from the USA are subsequently
more likely to implement and enforce anti-trafficking policies [8, 13, 14: 23, 28; 42].
Strategic compliance may occur when countries invest in anti-trafficking policies as a
means of demonstrating their devotion to human rights matters in order to reach other
goals, like entering trade partnerships or membership in prestigious international
organizations. For that matter, seeking membership in or being member of organiza-
tions such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has proven to exert significant positive influence on implementation and
enforcement of anti-trafficking laws in post-communist countries [12].
From an international relations perspective a third reason for compliance with global
treaties such as the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol might be the existence of regional
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treaties and anti-trafficking directives. Especially in Europe a number of binding
international documents and clarifications of states’ responsibilities in regards to human
trafficking with a particular focus on the protection of victims have emerged after 2000,
while in other regions the UN Trafficking Protocol is still the dominant tool to combat
trafficking. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings (Warsaw Convention), which was passed in 2005 and came into force in 2008,
stipulates that the identification and protection of victims are “paramount objectives”
[21: 7] in the fight against human trafficking. Besides this focus on victims’ rights the
Warsaw Convention is accompanied by formal monitoring mechanisms through the
Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking (GRETA) which further increases
liability for states. In 2010 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) clarified in
its judgement on the case Rantsev vs. Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHHR 1 that
although the protection of victims of human trafficking is not explicitly mentioned it is
covered by Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The
judgement spells out that in face of existing European legislation it is compelling for
authorities in all Council of Europe member states to proactively investigate in
circumstances that potentially involve human trafficking, and to provide for the safety
of potential trafficking victims. The judgement further broadens the prosecutive ap-
proach to human trafficking by emphasising requirements in regards to prevention of
trafficking and protection of its victims. Lastly, in 2011, the European Union adopted
the Directive on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims,
which further enhances the legal rights of trafficking victims. Amongst others the EU
Directive urges states to tailor protection measures to the gender as well as the
trafficking purpose of victims. Through their binding character as well as their promo-
tion of victim-centered approaches in combatting human trafficking all three regional
documents are likely to influence state compliance with the global UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol, especially in regards to the dimension of victim protection.
Research also indicates that states’ internal attributes and processes can contribute to
the enforcement of anti-trafficking efforts and implementation of measures to protect
trafficking victims. In an analysis of all countries included in the 2009 US Department
of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report, Wooditch [15] finds that a high status of
women in society increases trafficking related prosecutions. Bartilow [14] discovered
further evidence for the positive association between women’s equal rights and states’
counter-trafficking enforcement. In addition, Bartilow’s study shows a positive effect of
gender representation in government and legislative chambers on the enforcement of
anti-trafficking legislation, which is corroborated by later research [12: 316]. Freedom
of the press is another factor conducive to compliance with the UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol [27], indicating the relevance of communication channels for interest groups.
Besides Wooditch’s [15] analysis, the above studies allow no statement on possible
divergent effects on the enforcement of prevention, prosecution and protection policies,
as they assess the overall extent of government action taken against human trafficking.
Those studies analysing compliance separated into the UN Anti Trafficking
Protocol’s three policy dimensions find that in correspondence with the emphasis of
the Protocol many countries’ efforts regarding prosecution and prevention are strong,
whereas most governments score poorly on their efforts to protect victims [8, 9, 16].
This finding reflects the unbinding character of the Articles concerned with victim
protection caused by the crime framework under which the UN Anti-Trafficking
158 J. Schönhöfer
Protocol was issued with its focus on prosecution and prevention. Furthermore, high
costs associated with victim protection policies can account for sub-standard achieve-
ments [8: 254]. In addition, states might prefer prosecution over protection because
they fear generous treatment of victims might lead to increased illegal immigration
[11]. Nevertheless, we find a number of states, which enforce comprehensive victim
protection measures as part of their counter-trafficking efforts despite the high costs and
the non-binding character of articles concerned with victim protection in the UN Anti-
Trafficking Protocol. They are often characterised by being of civil law origin [11] as
well as the absence of corruption [8, 9, 30]. Likewise, governments in countries with
Christian majorities on average carry out more comprehensive victim protection than
countries where the majority is of Muslim faith, while however these differences are
more pronounced in autocracies than in democracies [16: 18–20].
The above findings indicate the importance of structural opportunities to raise
concerns and claims related to human trafficking, as well as the need for agents who
are willing to implement these demands into policies and practice. However, research
has not yet scrutinized which features of government and parliament beyond the share
of female parliamentarians are associated with the provision and enforcement of
comprehensive victim protection policies. This is surprising, as cabinet and parliament
are core institutions of national policymaking. Which of their attributes might be
conducive to the implementation of strong efforts to protect victims of human
trafficking?
Hypotheses
Studies have identified a positive relation between the share of parliamentary seats held
by women and endeavours to fight human trafficking in regards to prosecution but also
concerning prevention and the protection of victims [8, 9, 12, 14, 16]. The percentage
of female members in parliament measures so-called “descriptive representation” of
women. Descriptive representation means that the descriptive characteristics of elected
representatives reflect the demographic composition of the represented population [43].
This descriptive representation can lead to “substantive representation”, which means
that politicians purposely act on behalf of their counterparts in society who share the
same descriptive characteristics [43, 44: 60–91]. The transition from descriptive to
substantive representation is possible whenever an issue at stake invokes shared
concerns rooted in a common ethnic, social- or gender-based background of represen-
tatives and the represented [45–48]. Substantive representation of female interests by
female members of parliament is illustrated by the fact that the latter have been shown
to be more likely to introduce and pass legislation that addresses women’s concerns
such as child support, equal pay, or criminalization of sexual assault and domestic
violence [49–54]. Anti-trafficking campaigns often portray stark gendered stereotypes
of female victims suppressed by male traffickers [17, 18, 55]. The UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol’s full name itself contributes to this understanding through its suffix “espe-
cially women and children”, which displays victim protection as a policy tool to pre-
eminently empower women. I therefore expect:
H1: The higher the proportion of women in a country’s federal parliament, the
stronger are efforts to protect trafficking victims in this country.
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However, this positive association between women in parliament and comprehen-
sive victim protection policies might change, once other characteristics of the legisla-
tive are taken into account. That is to say public policy output also depends on the
preferences of the (majority) party in government [56, 57] as well as on parliament’s
support for their proposed policies [57–59]. Political parties differ in their
ideological positions, and these ideological differences matter for a govern-
ment’s policy output [56, 60]. Social democratic parties in office consistently
correspond to higher welfare expenditures and more generous social legislation
[57, 61–63: 165, 171]. Hence, parties have clear preferences, which shape
public policy proposals and -outputs of the parties in government. Policies to
protect trafficking victims should appeal to left and social democratic parties, which
reportedly endorse protection of vulnerable population as well as equal opportunities.
Their aversion against social exclusion should shape government activity on human
trafficking when they hold office:
H2: The proportion of left and other social democratic parties in a country’s
federal cabinet positively influences this country’s compliance with victim
protection.
Yet, in democratic political systems more actors than just the incumbent
party are involved in policymaking to impose limits to the incumbent’s scope
of action [64].
The beneficial effect of the cabinet’s ideology on a country’s victim protec-
tion efforts is applicable to parliament as well [65, 66]. Victim protection
policies contribute to social justice and special protection for underprivileged
minorities. Therefore, victim protection efforts are expected to be more com-
prehensive where there is a favourable overall parliamentary attitude towards these
two issues:
H3.1: If a country’s national parliament has a high proportion of positive attitude
towards social justice, this country’s victim protection efforts will be more
pronounced.
H3.2: If a country’s national parliament has a high proportion of positive attitude
towards the special protection of minorities, this country’s victim protection
efforts will be more pronounced.
In addition, left parties in cabinet and their parliamentary environment should have a
combined effect on the existence and enforcement of victim protection policies. For the
government’s ideational preferences to show in policy output, the cabinet must over-
come parliament votes against its policy propositions [57: 174]. No or little discrepan-
cies between the cabinet’s and the parliament’s attitude towards social justice and the
inclusion of underprivileged minorities implies that the protection-favouring party in
government faces less resistance when parliament votes on their policy propositions –
especially if the share of cabinet seats held by left parties is small due to a coalition
government. If government and the parliament agree, veto points can be passed more
easily [58, 59]. Hence, the effect of the share of left parties in cabinet on benevolent
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protection policies is conditional on the overall supportive attitudes towards social
justice and the inclusion of minorities in parliament.
H4.1 The effect of left parties in cabinet will be more pronounced where the
parliament favours social justice.
H4.2 The effect of left parties in cabinet will be more pronounced where the
parliament favours the inclusion of underprivileged minorities.
Data and methods
Case selection
The above hypotheses are tested in a sample of 33 current democratic EU and/or
OECD member countries over a period of 12 years (2000–2011).2 The countries were
selected for three reasons. Firstly, the study focuses on internal government and
parliament characteristics of states. Yet, the literature review has shown that interna-
tional factors do play a role in explaining compliance with international treaties like the
UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. Building the sample around advanced industrial democ-
racies levels differences in susceptibility to influence of international factors such as
dependence on foreign aid or prospective membership in prestigious institutions.
Nevertheless, differences in regards to economic pressure and affliction with human
trafficking remain and will be controlled for in the analysis. This will allow for
ascribing findings to the analysed internal factors.
Secondly, the countries in the sample are predominantly transit or destination countries of
human trafficking. As such, they are the site of transport and exploitation for trafficking
victims. Hence the study addresses the provision of protection measures for trafficking
victims where the existence of the latter is most pressing, namely where victims find
themselves most vulnerable, in a foreign environment and under the strain of exploitation.
Lastly, the eradication of human trafficking has been promoted as priority issue by
EU and OECD member countries for the last 15 years [21, 22, 101–103]. Furthermore,
the latter countries have played a key role in creating and promoting the UN Anti-
Trafficking Protocol. As a result, it is interesting to see whether this is “cheap talk” [29]
or whether these states actively enforce their self-made international standards of the
UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol to protect end empower victims of human trafficking
within their national borders.
Measures
Dependent variable
The outcome of interest for this study is a country’s enforcement of victim protection
policies as stipulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. This is assessed with the
sub-index “protection” taken from the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index [8]. This index
2 See Table 2 in the Appendix for a list of the sample countries.
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annually rates national government efforts to implement and enforce policies to protect
trafficking victims on a five-point scale from the year 2000 onwards. A score of 1
indicates no efforts to protect trafficking victims, while 5 marks the best policy practice.
The evaluation of policy practice and enforcement is based on the requirements
formulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. As such, no punishment for criminal
offences committed by trafficking victims as a result of being trafficked (e.g. breaching
immigration laws or engaging in prostitution in countries it is illegal), efforts to identify
victims, provision for victims’ physical, psychological and social recovery through
housing, medical assistance, job training, and (temporal) residence permits are primary
coding interests [8].3 The sub-index “protection” gives an overall account of protection
efforts suitable to answer the hypotheses of this study.
The information source for coding the sub-index “protection” are the annual
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports issued by the US Department of State and two
additional reports published by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime [5, 7].
The TIP Reports contain narratives about the scope and form of human trafficking as
well as government responses for more than 150 countries worldwide. They also
include tier-rankings of countries based on their anti-trafficking efforts. The lack of
transparency of these rankings and their use as a policy tool by the US government has
been frequently criticised [2, 67: 239; 74; 68: 477; 41]. Nevertheless, the country
narratives in the TIP Reports are the only available source, which provides annual
trafficking updates by simultaneously covering a broad range of countries [69: 10].
More recently the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
(GRETA) provides a more detailed instrument to assess victim protection efforts than
the 5 point sub-index of the 3P index [67: 239–240]. The GRETA scoring card is based
on the legislative and institutional obligations of the 2005 Warsaw Convention.
Therefore, availability of this measure is restricted to European countries. In addition,
information is only available after 2011, which makes the scoring card unsuitable for
the present study.
Hence, the following analyses employ the sub-index of “protection-policies” of the
3P Index as dependent variables despite the criticism associated with its information
sources. Most of this critique only refers to the misuse of the tier-rankings produced by
the US Department of State for foreign policy ends and not to the actual written
information in the country narratives of the TIP Reports. It is important to stress that
coding of the sub-index “protection policies” is solely based on written information
given in the TIP reports and ignores the numerical tier rankings. A cross-validation of
available measurements of governmental anti-trafficking efforts has shown that in
Europe the scores of the 3PAnti-Trafficking Index widely reflects other measurements
[67: 248].
Independent variables
Four variables were used to measure the descriptive and ideological composition of
national parliaments and cabinets. The presence of women in parliament is measured
by the percentage of parliamentary seats held by female parliamentarians, available
3 For a detailed outline of the 3PAnti-Trafficking Index coding procedures, please see http://www.economics-
human-trafficking.org/mediapool/99/998280/data/Coding_Guideline.pdf (accessed 4 March 2015).
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from the Comparative Political Data Set III (CPSD III) [70]. The presence of left parties
in cabinet is captured as a percentage of total cabinet posts of all government parties
held by social democratic and other left-wing parties, weighted by the number of days
the government was in office in a given year. This measure is also available in the
CPSD III data [71: 6]. Two variables were calculated to assess overall parliament
attitudes towards social justice and underprivileged minority groups. Data was used
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) [62, 72, 73], which are based on a
content analysis of party manifestos at national elections. The Manifesto Project
calculates, for each party in parliament, how many sentences relative to the length of
the overall party program are dedicated to 56 topical categories [73]. The two catego-
ries relevant to this paper are “social justice” which encompasses favourable references
to the need for fair treatment of all people, special protection for underprivileged, the
removal of class barriers, and “underprivileged minority groups”, which circumscribes
“favorable references to underprivileged minority groups who are defined neither in
economic nor in demographic terms” [73]. Larger values of these variables indicate a
more positive attitude towards social justice and underprivileged minorities. The overall
proportion of parliamentary attitudes towards these two categories for each country and
year were calculated following a two-step logic: first, the scores of each parliamentary
party were weighted by the number of parliamentary seats held by this party. Second,
the weighted scores of parliamentary parties were added for each national parliament to
obtain the proportion of positive attitudes towards social justice and underprivileged
minorities respectively.4
Control variables
Counter trafficking policies are not exclusively linked to left-wing and social demo-
cratic parties. Due to the prominent belief that human trafficking predominantly
consists of illegal sex trade [55, 74, 75], conservative parties might find anti-
trafficking efforts to be a suitable justification for prohibiting prostitution. The same
effect can be expected from parliaments endorsing law and order policies. Political
parties, which devote large parts of their electoral manifestos to fighting crime, might
try to push counter trafficking legislation in parliament, especially since the welfare of
victims is often present in rhetoric concerned with tough action on crime [76: 93–141].
Hence, victim protection efforts might emerge as a by-product of counter-trafficking
pursuits aimed at suppressing trafficking in persons. Consequently, the analysis con-
trols for the presence of right wing parties in cabinet measured by their percentage of
total cabinet posts taken from the CPSD III data,5 and parliamentary support for law
and order, calculated analogous to the parliamentary attitudes towards social justice
and underprivileged minorities using the CMP data.
4 The data of the Comparative Manifesto Project are panel data using parties as unit. The measures hence had
to be aggregated on country-year level. As a consequence, the two variables representing parliamentary
attitudes towards social justice and underprivileged minorities only change values in years in which elections
took place and are constant in between.
5 The CPS III Data distinguishes parties in three ideological categories: left-wing/ social democratic, right-
wing, and centre. The presence of the percentage of both left- and right- wing parties in the model does
therefore not introduce problems with multicollinearity, as this leaves the parties at the centre of the spectrum
of political ideologies as reference category.
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Four institutional characteristics, which influence the policymaking process were
controlled for. First, the existence of political constraints, for example rigid checks
and balances, confine the ruling party’s possibilities to introduce new policies at a
national level. The political constraints measure by Henisz [77] records the feasibility
of policy change. It captures “the extent to which any one political actor or the
replacement for any one actor – e.g., the executive or a chamber of the legislature – is
constrained in his or her choice of future policies.“ [78]. Second, corruption impairs a
country’s anti-trafficking efforts [30, 79]. Third and likewise, enforcement of policies
to protect trafficking victims depends on the availability of monetary resources [67:
245]. Hence, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the
central government debt as percentage of GDP as available in the CPSD III [70]
are included.6 Lastly and fourth, laws and policy practice are shaped by a country’s
legal origin [80]. This influence in turn can impact a country’s likelihood to adopt and
enforce comprehensive victim protection policies [11]. To this end the analysis
includes a dummy variable to identify whether a country’s legal origin lies in Civil
Law (French, Scandinavian, and German Commercial Codes) as opposed to Socialist/
Communist or Common Law.
Models also control for a number of international factors. First, the type of traffick-
ing a country is confronted with will likely shape counter-trafficking efforts [9, 16].
Dummy variables capturing whether a country is predominantly affected by trafficking
as either destination, origin, or transit state will be added to the analysis [69].
Furthermore, countries in Eastern Europe differ from the other sample countries in
terms of political and economic pressures. A dummy variable indicating the location of
a country in Eastern Europe is therefore included in the analysis.
Furthermore, by ratifying the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol states indicate their
awareness of human trafficking and its countermeasures. However, it may take some
time before the ratification results in the enforcement of proceedings to protect victims
of trafficking. Hence, the analysis contains a time variable counting the years since
ratification of the protocol to control for a state’s interest in suppressing human
trafficking.7 Lastly, to account for the relevance of binding regional treaties to victim
protection efforts a dummy variable to indicate whether a country has ratified the 2005
Warsaw Convention was included in all models.8
Analytic strategy
The data set has as a time-series-cross-section (tscs) structure with 396 country-year
observations of 33 countries between the years 2000 and 2011. The data meet the
minimum requirement of 10 repeated observations for pooled time series regressions
[81: 274; 82: 332]. Values of the independent and dependent variables vary over time
6 Government debt was standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing the result by the standard deviation
to arrive at a range of values comparable to the other variables.
7 For a systematic overview of the variables included in the multivariate analysis as well as their sources, see
Table 3 in the Appendix.
8 The EU Trafficking Directive as well as the judgement on Rantsev vs. Cyprus and Russia were omitted from
the analysis as the documents came into effect in 2011 and 2010, respectively. Since effects of such treaties
often show with some delay it was assumed that both decisions occurred too late in the observation period to
exert an observable influence on the dependent variable within the analyses.
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and countries.9 Given the ordinal structure of the dependent variable, ordered logit
regressions for pooled time series data were calculated.10 Standard errors were
clustered on country level to take into account that observations from the same
country are not independent from each other. The problem of autocorrelation is
addressed by inclusion of a one-year lag of the dependent variable (LDV) as
explanatory variable [81, 82]. The LDV may dominate the model’s explanatory
power [86: 231; 87: 336–343] but it can account for possible path dependency
of protection policies: policy decisions about victim protection in a given year
affect protection policies in the following year. The data do not suffer from
multicollinearity.11 In order to check robustness of the results additional models
with time-fixed effects and ordered probit regressions were run. Country fixed
effects are not included, as they lead to biased, inconsistent and distorted estimates in
ordered logit and probit and regressions [88: 407–408; 89: 1419–1423].
Results
Figure 1 displays the dispersion of protection efforts across the sample countries for
each year. Over time the number of countries in the sample pursuing very strong efforts
increases, whereas countries taking no action at all to protect victims of human
trafficking are only found at the beginning of the observation period. The graph also
shows that the sub-index protection is unavailable in a number of instances throughout
the first 3 years of the observation period.
Figure 2 illustrates four exemplary trajectories of the implementation of
victim protection within the sample countries: initial improvements with a later
decline in efforts to protect trafficking victims (Bulgaria), high volatility and
inconsistency of enforcement of victim protection policies (Japan), a clear trend
to improve efforts to protect victims of human trafficking over the course of
time (Slovenia), as well as stable and but declining efforts to protect trafficking
victims (United Kingdom).
What information do these numerical values of the index convey? The original
coding material of the index “protection” (the TIP and UNOCD Reports) reveals that
common reasons for declines in the “protection” index scores within these four
countries encompass failure to effectively identify victims of human trafficking and a
lack of proactive endeavours to detect trafficking victims in risk populations [90: 124–
125; 91: 149–152; UNOCD 2009: 240–241]. In some instances victims were not
identified as such and hence were wrongfully punished for breaching immigration
9 For summary statistics between countries, within countries, and across time of the variables included in the
multivariate analysis please see Table 4 in the Appendix. Furthermore, Figure 4 in the appendix shows the
victim protection trajectories for all countries in the sample.
10 Probit and logit regressions are a standard approach for dependent variables with only two possible
outcomes. Ordered logit is a generalization of the standard logit model allowing more than two outcomes
of the dependent variable [85]. The Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption indicates that the latter is
only violated for the lagged dependent variable. This variable however is only used as a control for
autocorrelation in the time series. Therefore ordered logistic regressions rather than multinomial or generalised
ordered logit models were calculated.
11 Collinearity statistics available from the author by request.
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laws (United Kingdom in 2008, Japan in 2007) or crimes committed as a direct result of
being trafficked12 (Bulgaria in 2008) [90: 124–125; 91: 255–256; 92: 94–95]. The low
index values for Bulgaria, Slovenia and Japan at the beginning of the observation
period reflect the lack of governmental protection services caused by limited funds
(Bulgaria and Slovenia), absence of witness protection capabilities (Bulgaria), refusal to
acknowledge the victim status of trafficked persons (Japan), and the failure to financially
support NGOs who work with trafficking victims (Japan) [31: 33; 93: 67; 52].
Slovenia’s success in establishing a sustainable system of state shelters and its
increasing collaboration with NGOs which offer counselling, legal support, and health
care has lead the country on a path towards steady improvement of its score on the
“protection” index [94: 136; 91: 227]. From 2008 onwards TIP reports describe
Slovenia as “sustaining generous victim assistance” [91: 227] practicing formalized
victim identification and referral mechanisms, granting amnesty to identified trafficking
victims, offering a 90-day reflection period where victims can decide whether or not
they would like to assist in prosecuting their traffickers, and paying annual funds of
over $100,000 to NGOs. These measures have been extended to provision of shelter,
rehabilitative counselling, medical and legal assistance, as well as vocational training
for trafficking victims and access to employment [7: 280–281]. The GRETA country
report for Slovenia, which was published in 2014, confirms ongoing comprehensive
victim protection efforts in Slovenia [95: 27–34]. However the Council of Europe
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Fig. 1 Victim protection efforts by year
12 Examples for crimes as a direct result of human trafficking are prostitution in countries where prostitution is
illegal but the victim is forced into it, or breaches of immigration law if the victim’s nationality requires a visa
in the destination country.
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formalising the identification process for victims and in abolishing differences in the
comprehensiveness of assistance and protection services contingent on the victims’
willingness to assist in the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers [95: 27, 30].
Starting from no victim protection at all, Japan displayed an “impressive start in
providing assistance to victims, including the implementation of a national action plan”
[96: 132] in early 2005. However, the government has repeatedly failed to comply with
its own agenda. Protection measures are mainly tailored to accommodate women who
are being trafficked for sexual exploitation purposes [7: 172].
Bulgaria gained index points in the mid-2000s through its passing of a bill to grant
comprehensive victim assistance, its investment in building government run shelters for
victims of trafficking and its close co-operation with anti-trafficking organizations [96:
128; 97: 89–90]. The more recent GRETA report of the first evaluation round reveals
that towards the end of the observation period the most significant deficiencies in
Bulgaria’s protection scheme for trafficking victims lie in the lack of protection services
for male victims, failure to identify unaccompanied minors as trafficking victims and
the subsequent imposition of educational obligations rather than protective measures, as
well as insufficient government funds to expand protection services beyond minimum
provisions [98: 35–43].
The United Kingdom (UK) gained its positive ranking through funding anti-
trafficking NGOs providing shelter and counselling for victims and by establishing a
“National Referral Mechanism” with clear operating procedures for officials encoun-
tering victims of human trafficking [97: 294–295; 99: 254].
However, some deficiencies have prevented the UK from attaining the best possible
index scores: the shelters in operation are mainly streamlined to support female victims









































































Fig. 2 Trajectories of victim protection in Bulgaria, Japan, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom 2000–2011
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servitude, and forced labour [97: 294–295]. Furthermore, the fate of child victims after
leaving their foster-homes is unclear. Altogether, officials are criticized for not being
proactive enough in identifying victims at important ports of entry to the country [90:
204–205]. Additionally, many services available in the United Kingdom’s victim
protection program are conditional on victims’ willingness to assist in the prosecution
of their traffickers [92: 337]. Harsh enforcement of anti-immigration laws in the UK
have led to the prosecution of victims for breaching immigration laws, which resulted
in a further downgrade on the protection index [97: 294–295]. Many of the deficiencies
in victim protection efforts of the United Kingdom pointed out by the TIP
reports were also addressed in the first round of the GRETA evaluation of UK
anti-trafficking efforts [100: 49–72]. Especially the fact that in several instances
unaccompanied minors who were potential trafficking victims were either
deported back to the country they entered from within 24 hours without notifying
child protection services, were put in detention for breaching immigration laws, or were
placed in foster homes but subsequently went missing raised concern among members
of GRETA [100: 57–59].
Table 1 reports results from the multivariate analysis. All columns show proportional
odds calculated from ordered logit regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. The outcome in models 1 through 4 is the sub-index “protection” of
Cho et al. [8] as described in the previous section. Model 1 contains the main
independent variables. Model 2 adds two interaction effects between the share of left
parties in cabinet and parliament’s attitudes towards social justice and underprivileged
minorities, respectively. Model 3 adds control variables. Model 4 introduces time fixed
effects, which are not reported.13 All models contain a one-year lag of the dependent
variable “protection” to account for autocorrelation. The significant Likelihood Ratio
test statistics (LR) suggest that the predictor variables do have an effect on victim
protection efforts in all four models. Nagelkerke’s R shows proportions of explained
variance between 50 and 60 %.
After list-wise deletion the number of observations for the multivariate analysis is
reduced to 325 country year observations. 33 cases of these missing values can be
attributed to the lagged dependent variable, as the LDV is missing for each country’s
first year observation since there is no data for the year preceding the first observation.
Hence, the multivariate analysis only uses data from 2001 to 2011. In addition, the sub-
index “protection” is missing in a number of instances, especially at the
beginning of the observation period, which further reduces the number of complete
cases to 326. Early TIP reports contained fewer country narratives and those
countries with missing data at the beginning of the observation period were not
covered by those early TIP reports. Hence, no information about anti-trafficking
efforts of these countries could be coded. However, none of the independent
variables significantly predicts missing and non-missing cases on the dependent
variable. There was only one complete case with a score of 1 on the sub-index
“protection” (Greece in 2003), which was excluded from analyses so as not to
distort results.14
13 Available from author by request.
14 Please find a table with bivariate relationships between independent and dependent variables in Table 5 in
the Appendix.
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Table 1 Ordered logit regression (Pooled Analysis, Odds Ratios, Outcome = Index “Protection”)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Protection(t-1) 5.816*** 5.639*** 4.993*** 5.629***
(1.399) (1.359) (1.184) (1.379)
Women in parliament (% seats) 153.375** 247.385*** 53.370* 73.327*
(240.922) (406.250) (107.032) (149.855)
Left parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) 1.518 6.999* 23.778** 18.990**
(0.565) (5.335) (24.023) (19.456)
Parliament support for social justice 0.710 1.134 1.004 1.001
(0.199) (0.314) (0.430) (0.423)
Parliament support for minorities 1.499 1.854 0.798 0.922
(1.037) (1.420) (0.693) (0.763)
Left parties in cab.#parl. support social justice 0.171** 0.112* 0.134*
(0.108) (0.099) (0.123)
Left parties in cab.#parl. support minorities 0.455 0.284 0.270
(0.500) (0.376) (0.371)
Right parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) 2.267 2.236
(1.142) (1.128)
Parliamet support for law and order 1.625*** 1.551**
(0.237) (0.219)
Political constraints 2.158 1.707
(2.312) (1.846)
Time since ratification 1.153 1.167
(0.140) (0.203)
Time since ratification (squared) 0.981 0.982
(0.015) (0.020)
Corruption perception index 0.910 0.914
(0.146) (0.145)
Government debt (% gdp) 0.733 0.782
(0.129) (0.141)
Manily destination country 0.905 0.994
(0.413) (0.471)
Mainly transit country 0.827 0.775
(0.381) (0.363)
Eastern Europe 0.383 0.484
(0.275) (0.342)
Ratification Warsaw convention 1.018 1.024
(0.304) (0.326)
Legal origin: civil law 2.306* 2.284*
(0.828) (0.826)
Observations 325 325 325 325
Nagelkerke R^2 0.551 0.562 0.589 0.606
LR Test 229.384 236.427 253.625 264.675
Prob >LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; table displays odds ratios
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Model 1 shows a significant coefficient of the LDV (p < 0.001), correspond-
ing to the assumption that a country’s victim protection procedures are
path dependent: the enforcement of protection efforts in a given year is likely
to shape a country’s dealing with trafficking victims in the years to come.
Model 1 furthermore corroborates evidence for a positive (significant) and
strong link between women in parliament and the existence of comprehensive
protection policies for trafficking victims, even if other parliament and
cabinet characteristics are controlled for. In Model 2 the effects of protection
efforts in the previous year and the share of women in parliament remain
significant. The strength of the influence of women in parliament however
shrinks when control variables and time-fixed effects are introduced to the
analysis (Models 3 and 4).
In Model 2 a significant direct effect of left parties in cabinet (p < 0.05)
emerges, which remains significant in the subsequent models. This lends sup-
port to the hypothesis that left parties in cabinet are positively associated with a
country’s efforts to protect trafficking victims (H.2). Only the interaction be-
tween left parties in cabinet and parliament support for social justice is signif-
icant, but contrary to expectations does not suggest a mutually reinforcing
effect between the two variables: parliamentary support for social justice does
not seem to enhance the association between left parties in government and
victim protection efforts. To the contrary, the effect of left parties in cabinet on
victim protection efforts weakens in the case of strong parliamentary support
for social justice. The variables representing the ideological composition of
parliament remain insignificant in Model 2 and the more restrictive Models 3
and 4. Hence, the present data do not corroborate the assumption that benev-
olent attitudes towards social justice and underprivileged minorities in parlia-
ment alone (H3.1 and H3.2) correspond to more comprehensive policies in the
interest of trafficking victims.
Model 3 confirms that the findings of Model 2 are robust to the presence of
control variables. Interestingly, not benevolent attitiudes towards social justice and
underprivileged minorities but parliamentary support for law and order significantly
coincide with the existence and enforcement of more comprehensive victim pro-
tection policies. The presence of right parties in cabinet however seems to be
uncorrelated to victim protection efforts. Civil law countries are significantly more
likely to display high scores on the protection index than common law or socialist
ones. None of the other control variables shows a significant association with
victim protection efforts. Time since ratification of the UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol indicates a u-shaped relationship between time passed since ratification
and scores of the index “protection policies”: protection efforts increase shortly
after ratification of the protocol but then decrease the longer the ratification dates
back. Ratification of the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention appears to be
associated with more comprehensive compliance to the UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol, but not at conventional significance levels. Protection efforts are lower
in the presence of government debt, high levels of corruption, as well as in Eastern
European countries. These associations again are not significant at conventional
levels. Lastly, results indicate that protection services for victims of human traf-
ficking are not more comprehensive in transit or destination than in origin
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countries. Model 4 demonstrates that findings remain stable in the presence of time
fixed effects.15
Figure 3 unpacks the significant interaction between the share of left parties
in cabinet and parliament support for social justice. It demonstrates how the
effect of the share of left-wing and social democratic parties in cabinet changes
with various levels of parliamentary support for social justice for different
levels of efforts to protect victims of human trafficking: limited efforts
(Fig. 3.1), modest attempts (Fig. 3.2), strong efforts (Fig. 3.3), and very strong
efforts (Fig. 3.4).16
Figure 3 shows that the interaction between the share of left parties in
cabinet and parliamentary support for social justice is only significant for
limited, modest, and very strong efforts (Figs. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4) and is so only
for very low levels of parliamentary support for social justice. In Fig. 3.3
(strong efforts to protect victims) as well as for higher levels of parliamentary
support for social justice confidence intervals include zero, indicating that there
is no significant interaction between left and social democratic governments and
parliamentary support for social justice. What does this mean? Figures 3.1 and
3.2 show that the presence of left parties in cabinet reduces a country’s
probability to only make limited or modest attempts to protect victims of
human trafficking. However this negative effect becomes increasingly attenuated
the more parliamentary support for social justice exists. If left-wing parties in
cabinet try to prevent only limited or modest protection for victims (presumably
trying for stronger measures) then their efforts are thwarted by a parliament
with high levels of support for social justice, presumably aiming for the more
modest protection. In contrast, left parties in cabinet with no or only low levels
of parliamentary support for social justice increase the probability of very
strong victim protection efforts. Again, the presence of parliamentary support
for social justice actually diminishes this effect. Taken together, the presence of
parliamentary support for social justice seems to affect the policies of left and
social- democratic parties in cabinet as they constrain options for a very strong
protection of victims, and promote the more modest and limited approaches to
which the left wing parties in government are opposed.
Against the background of these results it appears as though parliamentary
support for social justice does not have the beneficial effect on victim protec-
tion efforts as expected in H3.1 and especially H4.1. Even though the provision
of comprehensive protection services for victims of human trafficking themat-
ically relates to social justice and support for underprivileged minorities, find-
ings of this paper indicate that in practice victim protection is more closely
related to criminal than social justice, as indicated by the positive effect of
parliamentary support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies in
models 3 and 4 of Table 1. National legislators thus seem to follow the crime
framework established by the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol rather than a social
justice and minority-oriented agenda.
15 The results of models 1 through 4 remain the same when calculating ordered probit instead of logit
regressions (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
16 Marginal effects were estimated on the basis of Model 3 in Table 1.
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Discussion and conclusion
This study assessed the link between domestic political factors and compliance with
victim protection as stipulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol in a sample of 33
countries from 2000 to 2011. It contributes to the broader question as to what drives
compliance with international treaties lacking enforcement mechanisms: is compliance
only caused by international actors and power politics, or can local actors also
contribute to shaping the implementation and enforcement of policies [101]? The
results showed that certain characteristics of national cabinets and parliaments are
indeed significantly associated with more comprehensive policy efforts to protect
victims of human trafficking.
The consistently positive relationship between female parliamentarians and the
existence and enforcement of comprehensive policies to assist victims in human
trafficking confirms the results of previous research [9, 12, 14].
Nevertheless, this study advances our knowledge of the substantive represen-
tation of minority interests by female members of parliament: the gender effect
remains stable and significant even when other parliamentary and government
features, which are conducive to the protection of trafficking victims are con-
trolled for.
The multivariate analysis identified additional significant effects of govern-
ment parties and the ideological composition of parliament: first, left-wing and
social democratic parties in cabinet coincide with strong efforts to accommo-
date, counsel and assist victims of trafficking in human beings. Yet, the effect
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Fig. 3 Average marginal effects of left parties in cabinet at different degrees of parliamentary support for
social justice (with 95 % confidence intervals)
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Contrary to assumptions this positive effect of left parties in cabinet is most
visible when there are low levels of parliamentary support for social justice.
However, high levels of parliamentary support for the strict enforcement of law
and order policies promote higher levels of efforts to protect victims of human
trafficking. These findings suggest that compliance with the dimension of
victim protection is more driven by a law- and order agenda than by a social
justice agenda. This reflects the framing of the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol as
a crime fighting rather than human rights document. Even compliance to the
Protocol’s neglected area of victim protection is advanced by parliaments
composed of political parties on whose agenda crime and the strict enforcement
of criminal justice policies is a salient topic, and who thus buy into the crime
framework of the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. Even though the dimension of
victim protection thematically aligns with support for social justice or under-
privileged minorities more generally, this agenda might actually be driven by a
more parochial welfare agenda, which is inimical to newcomers and protects
welfare provision for national citizens. Therefore the results demonstrate that
even if social justice is widely supported in parliament, its members are
cautious in supporting the most far-reaching and comprehensive measures.
Lastly, countries with a legal origin in civil law show higher levels of compli-
ance with the UN Anti Trafficking Protocol’s dimension of victim protection.
A caveat is necessary here: the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol grants its
ratifying states a high level of discretion regarding the policy dimension of
victim protection, as Articles 6 to 8 more strongly resemble recommendations
than obligations. For this reason, governments can design their protection
policies to firstly meet the circumstances they see themselves confronted with,
and secondly according to their own beliefs of best practice. If countries
experience that enforcement of generous victim protection policies serves as
an incentive for illegal immigrants to pretend they are victims of human
trafficking, they may easily cut back their protection efforts or make them
more restrictive (plausibly because of the popular voter backlash). This optional
character of the particular policy dimension of victim protection may render
domestic political factors like the ones identified in this study more significant.
Their influence may be less decisive regarding prevention and prosecution,
since these policy dimensions are formulated as obligations.
The results of this study yield important implications: firstly, future analyses
should not leave aside domestic political circumstances, actors, and their interplay
when trying to explain compliance with international treaties. Secondly, this paper
can serve as a basis for further qualitative in depth analyses on the role of the
administration and judiciary for the implementation of policies to protect and
support trafficking victims. The ordinal structure of the five-point scale index of
protection policies can only give a general account of how important the welfare
of trafficking victims is deemed in each country within the sample [102].17 Future
research should thus aim at a more refined measurement of victim protection
17 See also a recent article on performance indices in The Economist (8th November 2014): http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21631025-learn-ruses-international-country-rankings-how-lie-indices (accessed
17 Nov 2014).
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efforts, such as the new measure constructed from reports of the European
Council’s Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking [67] or data available
in the “Human Trafficking Indicators Database” [84]. In this vein a further avenue
for future research is to look in more detail into different groups of trafficking
victims and their access to victim protection services. The GRETA reports cited in
this study imply that the provision and especially comprehensiveness of protection
services varies greatly among groups of victims defined by victim characteris-
tics or purposes of trafficking. Especially males and (unaccompanied) minors
have been identified to be a disadvantaged group of victims in terms of access
to protection services even in environments where these were widely available
for other groups and rated as “strong” by the protection index used in this
study (e.g. United Kingdom). Similar mechanisms might be found in relation to
domestic vs. foreign trafficking victims as well as victims who have been
identified as such by a country different from the one providing protection to
the victim (e.g. repatriated victims to Slovenia).
Future research should also focus on a more detailed analysis of the inde-
pendent variables of this study as well as further potential domestic influences
which might drive compliance with the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol’s dimen-
sion of victim protection: do female parliamentarians feel a special “compas-
sionate solidarity” [103: 459] and responsibility towards trafficking victims due
to the phenomenon’s reputedly gendered nature? Or is human trafficking a
policy area over which women in politics can individuate and build up a
profile for themselves? Either way against the background of the GRETA
reports suggesting that protection efforts for women are generally superior to
those in place for men the role of female policy makers deserves closer and
more qualitative attention. Extensive analyses of parliamentary behaviour of
female members of parliament – such as their roll call history on legislative
proposals related to trafficking – can provide more fine-grained insights. Case
studies about legislative proposals and votes in regards to human trafficking
and victim protection could also shed more light on the role of government
parties and their ideational alignment. In addition, the role of social justice
agendas needs more research attention: when and how do welfare and social
justice policies become exclusive, and which minority groups are included and
which are not. These are questions that address the importance of solidarity
values in social justice policies and agendas, as well as public support for them.
Further potential drivers of compliance with victim protection efforts that
should be explored further are the role of particular trafficking patterns in a
country as well as the influence of regional guidelines as addressed in earlier
sections. This study has only assessed the influence of the Warsaw Convention,
which is owed to the observation period that ended in 2011. Now that the EU
Trafficking Directive as well as the judgement of Rantsev vs. Cyprus and
Russia have been effective for more than 5 years it is possible that these
constitute further important operators for compliance with victim protection as
stipulated in the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol. The Warsaw Convention and the
EU Trafficking Directive however also deserve attention in their own right: is
compliance to those treaties affected by similar mechanisms to the ones iden-
tified in this paper? In which ways do particular forms of trafficking patterns
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(e.g. domestic trafficking, trafficking for sexual exploitation, trafficking for
forced labour) impact on the landscape of victim protection measures that are
put in place?
Lastly, future research should investigate the role of domestic political
factors for the two other policy dimensions addressed in the UN Anti-
Trafficking Protocol: are government characteristics less important for compli-
ance to prevention and prosecution, because states have a lower level of
discretion regarding the implementation of these policy dimensions in their
domestic legislation and practices?
The results of this study suggest that the fate of trafficking victims is not
entirely a product of international power politics and interests. It is also the
result of complex interactions on the local level between governments, parlia-
ments and the legal system, the different interests and agendas of actors, and
the structures in which they operate.
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Protection policy measure based on
victim protection as prescribed in the
Palermo Protocol. 5 point scale: 1 = no
effort; 2 = limited efforts; 3 = modest
attempts; 4 = strong efforts; 5 = very
strong efforts
Cho et al. [8]
Women in parliament
(% seats)
Percentage of women in parliaments at
the end of the corresponding year
Armingeon et al. [70]: Comparative
Political Data Set III; Codebook:
Armingeon et al. [71]
Left parties in cabinet
(% cabinet posts)
Cabinet composition: social democratic
and other left-wing parties as a per-
centage of total cabinet posts, weighted
by the number of days the government
was in office in a given year
Armingeon et al. [70]: Comparative
Political Data Set III; Codebook:
Armingeon et al. [71]
Parliament support for
social justice
Ratio of favourable references in party
manifestos to the need of fair treatment
of all people, special protection for
underprivileged, the removal of class
barriers etc. of all parliamentary parties
in a given year weighted by the
number of parliamentary seats held by
each party
Own calculation based on the data of




Ratio of favourable references in party
manifestos to underprivileged minority
groups who are defined neither in
economic nor in demographic terms of
all parliamentary parties in a given year
weighted by the number of
parliamentary seats held by each party
Own calculation based on data of the





Cabinet composition: right-wing parties as a
percentage of total cabinet posts,
weighted by the number of days the
government was in office in a given year
Armingeon et al. [70]: Comparative
Political Data Set III; Codebook:
Armingeon et al. [71]
Parliament support for
law and order
Ratio of favourable references in party
manifestos to enforcement of all laws;
actions against crime; support and
resources for police; tougher attitudes
in courts etc. of all parliamentary
parties in a given year weighted by the
number of parliamentary seats held by
each party
Own calculation based on data of the




Measure to estimate the feasibility of
policy change considering the
restrictions on executives. Higher
scores indicate stronger political
constraints
Henisz [77]; Henisz and Zelner [78]
Time since ratification Count variable indicating the years which
have passed since a country’s
ratification of the UN Anti-Trafficking
Protocol for each year. Starts with 1 in
the ratification year. 0 if Protocol has
not yet been ratified in a given year









The CPI of Transparency International
Score relates to perceptions of the
degree of corruption as seen by
business people, risk analysts and the
general public and ranges between 10
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
The Quality of Government Basic
Dataset Version 21 May 2012 [83]
Government debt
(% of gdp)
Gross amount of government liabilities as
percentage of GDP
Armingeon et al. [70]: Comparative
Political Data Set III; Codebook:
Armingeon et al. [71]
Mainly destination
country
Dummy variable, 1 if country is mainly
destination country for human
trafficking
Own calculation based on Frank [84]
(variable destination_order),
supplemented with information
from the Appendix of [5] in
instances where the Human
Trafficking Indicators Database
(HTI) did not provide the data.
Mainly transit country Dummy variable, 1 if country is mainly
transit country for human trafficking
Own calculation based on Frank [84]
(variable transit_order),
supplemented with information
from the Appendix of [5] in
instances where the Human
Trafficking Indicators Database
(HTI) did not provide the data.
Mainly origin country Dummy variable, 1 if country is mainly
origin country for human trafficking
Own calculation based on Frank [84]
(variable source_order),
supplemented with information
from the Appendix of [5] in
instances where the Human
Trafficking Indicators Database
(HTI) did not provide the data.
Eastern Europe Dummy variable, 1 if country is situated
in Eastern Europe
Own coding, based on whether
country was a former communist
country (BGR, CZE, HUN, POL,
ROM, SVN, SVK, LVA, LIT, EST)
Ratification Warsaw
convention
Dummy variable, 1 if country has ratified
2005 Council of Europe Convention
Against Trafficking in Human Beings
(Warsaw Convention)




(accessed 26 May 2016)
Legal origin: civil law Dummyvariable, 1 if a country’s legal origin
lies in Commercial Code (French,
German, or Scandinavian), 0 if a
country’s legal origin is English Common
Law or Socialist/Communist Law
Own caluclation based on data from
The Quality of Government Basic
Dataset Version 21 May 2012 [83]
(variable lp_lego)
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Table 4 Summary statistics of variables in multivariate analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Sub index
„protection“
overall 3.772.222 .9519401 1 5 N = 360
between .6927895 2.333.333 4.916.667 n = 33
within .650966 1.499.495 5.438.889 T-bar =10.9091
Women in parliament
(% seats)
overall .2290813 .1006965 .071 .473 N = 396
between .0979326 .0889 .4530667 n = 33
within .0285672 .1155813 .4078313 T = 12
Left parties in cabinet
(% cabinet posts)
overall .3427657 .3647292 0 1 N = 396
between .2273602 0 .8648417 n = 33
within .2877052 -.522076 1.147.332 T = 12
Parliament support
for social justice
overall .7567257 .4656563 .0819237 2.540.941 N = 396
between .3964287 .2540046 1.848.362 n = 33
within .2530939 .1299998 176.114 T = 12
Parliament support
for minorities
overall .204839 .2220006 0 1.104.333 N = 396
between .1856566 .0333197 .9524725 n = 33




overall .4308843 .3656653 0 1 N = 396
between .2263515 0 .8856167 n = 33
within .28966 -.2834323 1.295.726 T = 12
Parliamet support for
law and order
overall .920759 .8160259 0 6.406.714 N = 396
between .6761093 .2306212 4.081.363 n = 33
within .4706426 -105.204 3.246.111 T = 12
Political constraints overall .4618604 .1153753 .13334 .72 N = 396
between .0901059 .253346 .7066298 n = 33
within .0736103 -.0090976 .7285404 T = 12
Time since
ratification
overall 2.691.919 2.993.839 0 11 N = 396
between 1.478.357 0 05. Mai n = 33
within 2.615.033 -2.808.081 8.191.919 T = 12
Corruption perception
index
overall 6.812.107 1.974.011 2.6 10 N = 393
between 1.963.926 3.226.012 9.508.661 n = 33
within .351999 5.771.487 804.599 T-bar =11.9091
Government debt
(% gdp)
overall -2.35e-09 1 -1.434.789 428.219 N = 396
between .9643134 -1.369.321 3.099.426 n = 33
within .3098315 -.8711491 1.536.535 T = 12
Mainly destination
coutry
overall .5176768 .5003196 0 1 N = 396
between .4154971 0 1 n = 33
within .2872098 -.3989899 135.101 T = 12
Mainly transit
country
overall .1868687 .3902992 0 1 N = 396
between .275623 0 .9166667 n = 33
within .2801446 -.729798 1.103.535 T = 12
Eastern Europe overall .3030303 .4601496 0 1 N = 396
between .4666937 0 1 n = 33
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Table 4 (continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
within 0 .3030303 .3030303 T = 12
Warsaw convention
ratified
overall .1742424 .3797977 0 1 N = 396
between .1784429 0 .5 n = 33
within .3365875 -.3257576 1.007.576 T = 12
Legal origin: civil law overall .4848485 .5004026 0 1 N = 396
between .5075192 0 1 n = 33
within 0 .4848485 .4848485 T = 12
Table 5 Bivariate correlation (Spearman) between independent and dependent variables (t-statistics in
parentheses)
Protection
Protection (t-1) 0.7142 (0.0000)
Women in parliament (% seats) 0.4738 (0.0000)
Left parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) 0.1324 (0.0169)
Parliamentary support for social justice -0.0530 (0.3411)
Parliamentary support for minorities 0.0765 (0.1691)
Right parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) -0.1068 (0.0545)
Parliament support for law and order -0.1061 (0.0560)
Political constraints 0.0252 (0.6504)
Time since ratification 0.1171 (0.0349)
Corruption perception index 0.3263 (0.0000)
Government debt (% of GDP) 0.0675 (0.2251)
Mainly destination country 0.1818 (0.0010)
Mainly tranist country -0.0270 (0.6271)
Eastern Europe -0.3264 (0.0000)
Warsaw convention ratified -0.0093 (0.8679)
Legal origin: Civil law 0.3422 (0.0000)
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Table 6 Ordered probit regression (Pooled Analysis, Outcome = Index “Protection”)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Protection(t-1) 0.947*** 0.933*** 0.881*** 0.934***
(0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125)
Women in parliament (% seats) 2.964*** 3.146*** 2.243* 2.323*
(0.897) (0.933) (1.112) (1.163)
Left parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) 0.247 1.044* 1.785** 1.700**
(0.216) (0.452) (0.583) (0.599)
Parliament support for social justice -0.148 0.101 0.045 0.065
(0.156) (0.153) (0.237) (0.233)
Parliament support for minorities 0.131 0.196 -0.261 -0.204
(0.357) (0.396) (0.451) (0.421)
Left parties in cab.#parl. support social justice -0.976* -1.250* -1.192*
(0.388) (0.514) (0.553)
Left parties in cab.#parl. support minorities -0.264 -0.661 -0.659
(0.589) (0.723) (0.748)
Right parties in cabinet (% cabinet posts) 0.473 0.467
(0.262) (0.266)
Parliamet support for law and order 0.285** 0.264**
(0.090) (0.088)
Political constraints 0.511 0.430
(0.657) (0.652)
Time since ratification 0.081 0.096
(0.072) (0.097)
Time since ratification (squared) -0.012 -0.013
(0.009) (0.011)
Corruption perception index -0.054 -0.053
(0.091) (0.091)
Government debt (% gdp) -0.193 -0.178
(0.103) (0.101)
Manily destination country -0.016 0.028
(0.247) (0.264)
Mainly transit country -0.080 -0.096
(0.252) (0.253)
Eastern Europe -0.566 -0.463
(0.395) (0.386)
Ratification Warsaw convention 0.040 0.038
(0.162) (0.170)
Legal origin: civil law 0.460* 0.462*
(0.186) (0.190)
Observations 325 325 325 325
Nagelkerke R^2 0.540 0.550 0.582 0.596
LR Test 222.962 229.150 248.696 258.068
Prob >LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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